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The Devil Is in the Lack of Details
ANN M. KILLENBECK*
INTRODUCTION
In an interesting and potentially important article, Professor Deirdre M. Bowen
declares that her goal "is to scrutinize what happens when the judiciary and anti-
affirmative action activist groups exploit color blindness to rationalize away
affirmative action admissions policies."' She argues that her research and her study
demonstrate that "reactionary 'color blindness' 2 does not actually show that
"affirmative action is no longer necessary.",3 Instead, she believes the results of her
study establish that anti-affirmative action forces have embraced an "ideal [that] does
not appear to exist" and are "promoting a deeply flawed discourse [by asserting] that
affirmative action causes stigma.
'A
My emphasis on the words "research," "study," and "results" is intentional.
Professor Bowen now writes as a law professor, but her initial academic homes were in
sociology and criminal justice. Her first postbaccalaureate degree was in law, but her
most recent academic training is in sociology, and this informs much of what she tries
to accomplish. For me, then, the noteworthy portions of her article are those that mark
it as an empirical study: survey research that collects and analyzes data, testing a series
of hypotheses against what is revealed by the information secured.'
Professor Bowen's article is part of a long and important dialogue between lawyers
and social scientists focusing on what Judge Richard Posner characterized as "the need
for empirical knowledge." 6 As Posner stressed, in many important cases "[tihe big
problem is not lack of theory, but lack of knowledge-lack of the very knowledge that
[social science] research, rather than the litigation process, is best designed to
* J.D., Ph.D. Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. I want to thank
Katherine LaBeau for offering me the opportunity to comment on Professor Bowen's article.
This comment, like all of my work on affirmative action and diversity, draws deeply on the
perspectives and skills I gained during my studies with Dr. Michael T. Nettles, formerly a
Professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education at the University of Michigan and
now Senior Vice President and Edmund W. Gordon Chair for Policy Evaluation and Research at
the Educational Testing Service.
1. Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment
Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1204-05 (2010) (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 1201.
3. Id. at 1202.
4. Id. at 1244.
5. That is what I did at the University of Michigan, where survey research provided the
foundations for my doctoral dissertation. See Ann M. Killenbeck, Racial Diversity in Legal
Education: Do Racially Diverse Educational Environments Affect Selected Attitudes of White
First-Year Law Students? (May 3, 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan) (on file with author). This was the first social science study exploring whether
diverse learning environments produced actual changes in selected law student attitudes.
6. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
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produce.",7 Indeed, Professor Bowen ties her work to one of the most significant
decisions in the law and social science canon, Brown v. Board of Education, arguing
that "U]ust as the Supreme Court in Brown ... considered empirical evidence as it
contemplated which social experiment should be adopted-integration or
segregation-this study offers legislators and courts alike the opportunity to take the
bold step of breathing new life into affirmative action.
' 9
Perhaps.
Professor Bowen believes that affirmative action's opponents ignore "the legacy of
past racism" and refuse to "confront present racism." 10 There are many who disagree,
viewing affirmative action as a form of invidious discrimination" and, in the
noteworthy case of Justice Clarence Thomas, as "racial paternalism" that demeans and
harms the very individuals it is supposedly designed to benefit.' 2 My goal in this brief
Commentary is not to take sides in this debate. Rather, I want to do three things. First, I
will stress why rigorous and objective social science studies are so important in this
area. Second, I will raise questions about the extent to which Professor Bowen has
actually conducted a rigorous study showing that affirmative action itself is responsible
for many of the effects she identifies. Third, I will note why, in spite of this, certain of
her findings are interesting given a key aspect of the majority opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger,'3 that is, its acceptance of the argument that institutions may consciously
attempt to assemble a "critical mass" of minority students as part of a constitutionally
7. Id. I agree with Posner and assume Professor Bowen would too, although, ironically,
she criticizes Posner as one of the scholars who "re-conceptualized race as ethnicity." Bowen,
supra note 1, at 1209 n.56 (citing Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 1).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The use of social science materials by the Court has been
controversial. For the history and arguments, pro and con, see Anne R. Oakes, From
Pedagogical Sociology to ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Meaning ofDesegregation in Social
Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61 (2008), and Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown
Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for
Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2002).
9. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1199.
10. Id. at 1243.
11. See, e.g., Gail Heriot, Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 17 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 237, 238 (2008) (agreeing that we "should aspire to be a society in which
members of racial minorities are fully integrated into the mainstream" but questioning "whether
racial discrimination-something that nearly all Americans abhor-is an appropriate tool to
achieve that end").
12. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,372 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that affirmative action "tantalizes unprepared students with the
promise of a ... degree," only to place "overmatched students" who "cannot succeed in the
cauldron of competition"); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that affirmative action
is "racial paternalism" whose "unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as
any other form of discrimination").
13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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sound affirmative action plan.' 4 In particular, I will show why Professor Bowen's
arguments about the value of a critical mass-and the harms she posits when one is not
present-are suggestive but incomplete, given what I believe to be the single most
important obligation imposed on institutions employing affirmative action in pursuit of
diversity: the need to engage in proactive programming as an integral part of its
efforts.'
I.
The philosopher Lawrence C. Becker once argued that "[a]ll the relevant material
[about affirmative action] is known to people of good will on both sides; continued
discussion of it has very little practical effect beyond educating successive generations
of adversaries. '16 Professor Jack Greenberg, who as assistant counsel for the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund litigated many of the most important civil rights
cases decided between 1949 and 1984, agrees, noting that "[o]pposing sides in the war
over affirmative action in higher education have generated a rat's nest of arguments
over facts, philosophy, and constitutional law."'
17
I believe both Becker and Greenberg are correct in one important respect. Virtually
all of the arguments for and against affirmative action are couched in philosophical,
moral, or political terms. This makes it inevitable that the ensuing dialogue generates
wildly divergent and inevitably adversarial statements.' 8 The single most important
point of departure for most participants in these debates is their belief that a particular
vision should control. Affirmative action's supporters-among whom Professor Bowen
candidly places herself-believe deeply that it is morally right and educationally
necessary because "racism has more compelling roots than just individual actions" and
can be "found in the very social structures of society."' 9 Its opponents maintain with
equal vigor that "the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." 20 Both groups accordingly spend extraordinary
amounts of time and energy disputing, bitterly and at length, who may lay claim to
14. Id. at 330 (noting that the "concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce" and stating that "[tihese benefits are
substantial").
15. This is one of the major arguments that I make in my own work on this subject. See Ann
M. Killenbeck, Bakke, With Teeth? The Implications of Grutter v. Bollinger in an Outcomes-
Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2010).
16. Lawrence C. Becker, Affirmative Action and Faculty Appointments, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND THE UNiVEasrrY: A PHILosOPHICAL INQUIRY 93, 93 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 1993).
17. Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1610, 1610 (2003).
18. For a small sample of the hundreds of articles, pro and con, see Symposium, From
Brown to Bakke to Grutter: Constitutionalizing and Defining Racial Equality, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 1 (2004); Symposium, Meeting the Challenge of Grutter-Affirmative Action in
Twenty-Five Years, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2006); Symposium, Post-Grutter: What Does Diversity
Mean in Legal Education and Beyond?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 569 (2008).
19. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1208.
20. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
2010] 1263
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landmark rulings like Brown21 and what the Reverend Martin Luther King meant when
he appealed for "a nation where [people] will not be judged by the color of their skin
but by the content of their character."
22
Professor Bowen understands this,23 even as she makes it clear that she embraces
the rhetoric and arguments of the pro-affirmative action side. 24 But she also tries to
redirect the discussion by focusing on critical and too often ignored questions: What
does diversity mean as an educational matter? What actually happens to the students
themselves during their undergraduate education? And does affirmative action itself
actually play a role in all of this?
25
These questions lie at the heart of the Supreme Court's recent affirmative action
decisions, Grutter v. Bollinger26 and Gratz v. Bollinger.27 Much of the attention
devoted to these cases focuses on the threshold question posed and answered in
Grutter, "whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions... is unlawful. '28 A
narrow majority of the Court concluded that such policies are legal, holding, in an
opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, that the University ofMichigan Law
21. Compare id. at 747 (arguing that Brown stands for the proposition that state actors
cannot engage in "differential treatment to American children on the basis of their color or race"
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the decision "to invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of
Brown").
22. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in I HAVE A DREAM:
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 101, 104 (James M. Washington ed.,
1992). Compare Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REv. 599, 644-46 (2008) (arguing that a proper understanding of King's message
would allow institutions "to take race into account"), with STEPHAN THERNsTROM & ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONENATION, INDIviSiBLE 528 (1997) ("It was a
central hope of the civil rights movement that blacks would come to be seen as individuals-
'judged [not] by the color of their skin but by the content of their character,' as Dr. King so
famously put it." (alteration in original)).
23. See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 1, at 1199-1201 ("The debate over whether affirmative
action is an appropriate admissions policy in higher education continues to rage in academic,
activist, judicial, and citizenry circles." (footnotes omitted)).
24. See, e.g., id. at 1199 ("Affirmative action is but one brick in the institutional
reconstruction needed to undo the grip of the dominant group's privilege."); id. at 1244
("Affirmative action provides but one important tool in the tool box of equitable education. It
unmasks the brilliant disguise of the stigma fallacy and demonstrates the power of critical
mass.").
25. The best studies would be longitudinal, testing the effects of the presence or absence of
diversity over the course of a student's enrollment, rather than simply at a given point in time.
The important question is whether diversity actually changes attitudes or adds some otherwise
absent dimension to an education-what Professor Smith has called in her important new book
the extent to which it "interrupt[s] habitual modes of thinking." DARYL G. SMrrH, DrvERsrry's
PROMISE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION: MAKING IT WORK 211 (2009). Such changes can only be
measured by comparing student attitudes before and after the arguably critical event: education
and socialization in a diverse environment.
26. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
27. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
28. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311.
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School had "a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body"29 and that the
specific policy at issue was narrowly tailored and, therefore, constitutional. 30 But, as I
have argued at length elsewhere, 31 Grutter did more than simply resolve longstanding
questions about the legal force of Justice Powell's "lonely" opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.32 Rather, I believe that the most important aspect of
Grutter is that it tells us that we should focus our attention on "the educational benefits
that diversity is designed to produce" 33-- outcomes Justice O'Connor characterized as
"substantial" and "not theoretical but real. ' ,34
Professor Bowen devotes considerable space and attention to normative arguments.
In particular, she argues that "legislators and courts alike" need "to take the bold step
of breathing new life into affirmative action, 3 5 creating an environment within which
"remediation diversity can be accepted, and social justice achieved., 36 Those are noble
goals. But the individuals who designed Michigan's litigation strategy recognized that
even "Justice Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke . . .specifically precluded any
justification of using race and ethnicity as factors in admissions as a 'remedy' for past
societal discrimination." 37 They also understood that "[y]ou cannot separate social
29. Id at 328.
30. Id. at 334. In Gratz, the Court acknowledged that the Grutter principle controlled.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268 (stating that "for the reasons set forth today in Grutter... the Court has
rejected" the argument that diversity is not a compelling interest). But it held that a different
admissions policy was unconstitutional. Id. at 270 ("We find that the University's policy ... is
not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that [the University]
claim[s] justifies [its] program.").
31. See Killenbeck, supra note 15.
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). One of the major post-Bakke arguments was about the weight of
authority Justice Powell's opinion carried. Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,944 (5th
Cir. 1996) ("Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue."), and
Charles Fried, Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 47 (1995) ("What is called the controlling
opinion in Bakke, authored by Justice Powell, in fact was joined by no other member of the
Court."), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A]t
our level of the judicial system Justice Powell's opinion remains the law."), andAntonin Scalia,
Commentary, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take
Account ofRace," 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 148 (criticizing the Powell opinion as "thoroughly
unconvincing as an honest, hard-minded, reasoned [constitutional] analysis" but nevertheless
"one we must work with as the law of the land"). The Grutter majority punted, stating "[w]e do
not find it necessary" to resolve the issue and simply "endorse Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
34. Id.
35. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1199.
36. Id. at 1243.
37. Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 CoLuM. L. REv.
1589, 1590 (2003). Bollinger was president of the university at the time the lawsuits were filed
and, as such, the lead named defendant. The university refused to rely on the only other
constitutionally acceptable justification for employing race-based admissions criteria, the
"compelling interest of remedying the effects of [its own] past intentional discrimination." Cf
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). For a
discussion of the reasons for that decision, see Killenbeck, supra note 15, at 5 n.28.
2010] 1265
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reality from educational benefits." 38 Michigan therefore mounted what one observer
characterized as a "full-throated counteroffensive," a vigorous response that included
"the marshaling of statistical evidence of the benefits of racial diversity." 39 As one
university official noted, "[tihe lawsuits, ironically, did force the university to clarify
what it had been doing and why, and to articulate a rationale for the educational
benefits of diversity.'4
The "cornerstone" in that approach was "research evidence" regarding "the
educational value of diversity." 41 The need for that type of information became quite
clear in May 1997, when the Harvard University Civil Rights Project hosted a meeting
exploring the implications of recent judicial and political setbacks for proponents of
affirmative action and diversity.42 They had two goals: to examine with care what the
available social science studies showed about the actual impact of a diverse student
body on educational outcomes; and, anticipating the lawsuits everyone knew were
coming, to develop a research agenda to make the case for diversity before what one
individual attending characterized as "a reactionary Supreme Court.
'4 3
The picture painted was sobering. The lawyers present "poked ... holes" in the
research presented, "disheartening some of the academics... who were confronted
with the need to justify a concept they believe in implicitly." 44 That was not surprising
given the number and types of studies available at that time. As the then-President of
Harvard University, Neil L. Rudenstine, subsequently stressed, "current research on
diversity [was] not substantial enough to withstand a court's scrutiny."45 Everyone
involved-educators, social scientists, and lawyers-recognized the need to transform
what had largely been an article of faith into an educational fact. Anything short of that
posed far too many risks, given the intense scrutiny an increasingly skeptical Supreme
Court was imposing on any measure that actively considered race as an element in the
decision-making process.46 The defense team assembled by Michigan decided,
38. Bollinger, supra note 37, at 1591.
39. Steven A. Holmes, A New Turn in Defense ofAffirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1999, at Al.
40. Earl Lewis, Why History Remains a Factor in the Search for Racial Equality, in
DEFENDING DIvERsrry: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ATTHEUNIVERSITYOFMICHIGAN 17,55 (Patricia
Gurin, Jeffrey S. Lehman & Earl Lewis eds., 2004) [hereinafter DEFENDING DIvERsITY]. At the
time Lewis was the dean of Michigan's Rackham Graduate School.
41. Patricia Gurin, Eric L. Dey, Gerald Gurin & Sylvia Hurtado, The Educational Value of
Diversity, in DEFENDING DIvERsITY, supra note 40, at 97, 99.
42. See Douglas Lederman, Backers ofAffirmative Action Struggle to Find Research That
Will Help in Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDuC. (Wash., D.C.), May 23, 1997, at A28. This meeting
was by invitation only and I was present, invited in light of the work I was undertaking for my
dissertation.
43. Id. (quoting Anthony M. Platt, professor of social work, California State Univ. at
Sacramento).
44. Id.
45. Matthew W. Granade & Adam S. Hickey, High Court Will Rule on Merits of Diversity,
HARv. CRIMsON, Sept. 12, 1997, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article/l1997/9/12/
high-court-will-rule-on-merits.
46. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995) (emphasizing
that "all [governmental] racial classifications" are subject to the rigors of strict scrutiny).
Adarand was at the time the Court's most recent affirmative action decision. One of the central
1266 [Vol. 85:1261
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accordingly, to develop a "broad array of evidence" designed to "support [the
university's] educational judgment"; 47 that is, the university's belief that it should
assemble "'a mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will
respect and learn from each other.'-4
8
Six years later the Supreme Court vindicated Michigan's strategy in an opinion
stressing that the benefits associated with diversity were documented by "the expert
studies and reports entered into evidence at trial" 49 and "numerous studies show[ing]
that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes and 'better prepares students
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals."''50 Various prominent social scientists viewed these results as a
vindication of their efforts. One expert that Michigan relied on, Professor Sylvia
Hurtado, characterized the decisions as "a victory for higher education research," given
that "the evidence about the need for racial diversity in education was cited as
compelling evidence by both the appellate court judge in the undergraduate case and
by the Supreme Court, with Sandra Day O'Connor writing the opinion for the majority
in Grutter."5'
The individuals who challenged Michigan's policies, in turn, now appear to
understand that they made a critical tactical mistake: they failed to challenge this
portion of Michigan's case at the trial level, in effect conceding the point that diversity
could have positive educational outcomes.5 2 Future defendants may not be so fortunate.
Indeed, in what some critics characterized as an attempt "to foment . . . further
litigation,, 53 Justice Scalia noted in Grutter that "[o]ther lawsuits may focus on
whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educational benefits flow from racial
diversity," an "issue [that] was not contested" in that case. 4 Perhaps recognizing this,
Roger Clegg, the vice president and general counsel of the Center for Equal
premises in the majority opinion was that there was, at least for constitutional purposes, no such
thing as a"benign" racial classification and that "'[m]ore than good motives should be required
when government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification
system."' Id, at 226 (quoting Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453,458, 485 (1987)).
47. Jeffrey S. Lehman, The Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Discussions
ofAffirmative Action from Bakke to Grutter, in DEFENDING DIVERSrrY, supra note 40, at 61, 89.
Lehman was dean of the University of Michigan Law School when the suits were initiated.
48. Id. at 67 (quoting the Law School's admissions policy).
49. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
50. Id. (quoting Brief of Am. Educ. Research Ass'n, Ass'n of Am. Coils. & Univs. & Am.
Ass'n for Higher Learning as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241)).
51. Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity with the Educational and Civic Missions of Higher
Education, 30 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 185, 188 (2007).
52. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (stating that
plaintiffs did not dispute that "racial diversity... may provide ... educational and societal
benefits"). The few challenges eventually made were too little and came too late. See, e.g., Brief
for Amicus Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 18-21, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241) (citing a single study that showed that the "fostering of group over individual
identity by universities has led to more, not less, racial balkanization on our nation's campuses"
(emphasis in original)).
53. Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 889, 896
(2004).
54. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Opportunity, now stresses that "[I] ike generals, lawyers often err by preparing to fight
the just-past war rather than the next one."55 He suggests six arguments that should be
made in future litigation, the first of which is to "[a]ttack the social science evidence
that diversity provides 'educational benefits." 5 6 In particular, he states that "evidence
cited in support of this notion needs to be attacked aggressively, and the
counterevidence marshaled for the deleterious effects of preferences, particularly with
regard to the members of those groups supposedly being benefited.
57
II.
It is important to recognize what the Court did, and did not do, in Grutter. Justice
O'Connor did make it clear that social science evidence about the effects of diversity
was important. Other Justices recognized this, pointedly noting that the plaintiffs had
not contested this issue58 and observing that "[t]he Court relies heavily on social
science evidence to justify its" decision. 59 Justice O'Connor did not, however, cite any
specific studies. 6° In particular, she never mentioned what Michigan and many others
argued at the time was the most important of them, that of Professor Patricia Gurin,
61
which the university characterized as providing "conclusive proof that a racially and
ethnically diverse university student body has far-ranging and significant benefits for
all students, non-minorities and minorities alike. 62
Social science's "victory" in Grutter was a tenuous one. The evidence the university
marshaled was clearly important. But it was, even after six years of intense activity,
also arguably weak.63 Accordingly, it is essential that current research employ sound
55. Roger Clegg, Attacking "Diversity": A Review of Peter Wood's Diversity: The
Invention of a Concept, 31 J.C. & U.L. 417, 425 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Id. Clegg devotes almost six pages to this point and offers far more evidence than the
plaintiffs and their amici during the five and one-half years from filing the initial complaint to
the Court's decisions. See id. at 425-30.
58. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion).
59. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
actual statement is that the Court relied on this evidence to "justify its deference." Id. Whether
or not there was "deference" in the O'Connor opinion, and if so, as to what, is a hotly contested
issue. See Killenbeck, supra note 15, at 31-36.
60. This may have reflected the reality that virtually all of the studies available focused on
undergraduate education and had no bearing on whether diversity matters in the different and
distinctive world of legal education.
61. The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education: Expert Report of Patricia
Gurin, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (1999). None of the opinions in either Grutter or Gratz
mention, much less discuss, rely on, or criticize, the Gurin study.
62. The Compelling Needfor Diversity in Higher Education: Introduction, 5 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 243, 249 (1999).
63. A number of individuals have criticized the quality of the materials that Michigan relied
on. See, e.g., James H. Kuklinski, Review: The Scientific Study of Campus Diversity and
Students'Educational Outcomes, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 99 (2006); Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity
Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 625 (2006); Justin Pidot, Note,
Intuition or Proof: The Social Science Justification for the Diversity Rationale in Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REv. 761 (2006).
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methodology and that its findings bear out the claims made. Unfortunately, viewed in
this light, Professor Bowen's study leaves much to be desired.
Professor Bowen recognizes some of this. She concedes in her appendix that there
are certain limitations to her study, noting that "[i]n conducting any research, there are
constraints in what a researcher can do that lead to limitations on the conclusions
drawn from the research. ' 64 She acknowledges, for example, that her "sample is in no
way representative of the general population of minority students attending college and
university." 65 Professor Bowen was able to undertake, accordingly, only "an
exploratory study of over three hundred underrepresented minority students from
twenty-seven states" that offers "some trends of how to think about the . . .
arguments. 66 Unfortunately, the concession comes in the appendix,67 rather than in the
body of her article, where the disclaimer would have provided clearer context and had
greater force about the extent, for example, to which "legislators and courts" can or
should "take... bold step[s]" in response to this study.68
A second, more troubling problem occurs as the result of her inability to identify
which institution a given respondent attended, in particular whether it is public or
private. Professor Bowen observes in a footnote that her "Human Subjects Review
Board limited the type of questions [she] could ask"'69 and would not allow her to
"identify the school a respondent attended beyond the state in which it was located" or,
tellingly, whether it was public or private.70 She returns to this in her appendix.71 But
the qualifications she places on the conclusions she reaches are curious and limited. In
a textual footnote, for example, she notes only that "[t]hese variables most certainly
would have provided a more nuanced story."72 In the appendix, in turn, she states
regarding the public/private distinction that "[i]t may be that students are affected
differently within a state depending on the type of institution they attend ' 73 and that
knowing which institution they attend "would [have] allow[ed] for analysis on the
varying reaction to affirmative action policies based on the competitiveness of
admissions at a particular school.
74
Professor Bowen is correct that "identifying whether a student attends a public or
private university is important because affirmative action laws apply only to public
institutions. 7 5 The bans in place in her four "anti-affirmative action states" apply only
64. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1252 app.B.
65. Id.
66. Id. But see id. at 1204 (claiming that "[t]his article seeks to consider students'
experiences on a national scale"); id. at 1207 ("Part III explores the results from this national
study...."). These claims are technically true, but potentially misleading given the actual scope
of the study.
67. See id. at 1214-17 (discussing how the survey was conducted and noting the number of
participants).
68. Seeid. at 1199.
69. Id. at 1216 n.104.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 1252 app.B.
72. Id. at 1216 n.104.





to the public colleges and universities in those jurisdictions. 6 Thus, California's
Proposition 209 restricts what its elite public universities can do, for example, the
University of California, Berkeley and the University of California Los Angeles. But it
has no impact on policies at private institutions like the California Institute of
Technology, Stanford University, or the University of Southern California.
Unfortunately, we do not know, and given the limitations imposed on Professor
Bowen's study, we cannot know whether any of the institutions attended by any of the
participating students did or did not employ affirmative action when it admitted them.
California has hundreds of colleges and universities. But, as William Bowen and Derek
Bok documented in their important study, "[m]any people are unaware of how few
colleges and universities have enough applicants to be able to pick and choose among
them.",77 Like many others who have examined the question, they understand that "the
vast majority of undergraduate institutions accept all qualified candidates and thus do
not award special status to any group of applicants, defined by race or on the basis of
any other criterion., 78 Indeed, a recent study indicates that while the very top colleges
and universities are almost certainly more selective now than they were when Bowen
and Bok conducted their study, "the average college has not become more selective:
the reverse is true, though not dramatically.,
79
Simply put, most undergraduate institutions do not need to employ affirmative
action. But the fact that the highly selective ones do does not make Professor Bowen's
case. She stresses that the GPAs and SAT scores of the students who participated in
her study indicate that they have a "high level of academic achievement." 80 These
characteristics suggest that these individuals were likely targets for affirmative action
admissions and may well have matriculated at highly selective institutions. But even if
that is the case, that tells us nothing about the policies in effect at the institutions they
are attending. In California they may be attending Berkeley or UCLA, elite public
institutions that cannot use affirmative action. Or they may be enrolled at Cal Tech,
Stanford, or USC, equally elite private universities that remain free to do so.
This would not be a problem if Professor Bowen confined her observations and
findings to differences between student experiences in states that ban affirmative action
and those in states that allow it. That tells us something, although even here we need to
be careful. One of her so-called "anti-affirmative action states" is, after all, Michigan,
76. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting."). In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has long emphasized that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts only the actions of the states. See, e.g.,
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
amendment.").
77. WLLiAM G. BowEN & DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 15 (1998).
78. Id.
79. Caroline M. Hoxby, The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges 21-22 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,446,2009) (emphasis in original), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5446.
80. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1219.
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where the voters approved Proposition 2 in November 2006, a measure declaring that
"[t]he University of Michigan... shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin."81 It may well be that at a state level, as a political matter, Michigan
exhibits an "ongoing anti-affirmative action atmosphere in which students have
operated. 82 And it is also possible that some of those impulses may actually operate on
the campus of that state's elite institution, the University of Michigan. But it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to find any institution in this nation that exhibits, as a matter
of institutional climate, a greater and more pervasive commitment to affirmative action
and diversity.
Further, a substantial portion of Professor Bowen's findings are not confined to
questions about what may or may not be happening in a given state. She argues that
"the data from this study reveal that affirmative action-as a social experiment-may
be working"8 3 because "critical mass is more likely to occur in university settings that
use race-based admissions and those students are the ones least likely to report stigma
or overt racism." 84 She states that her survey "reveal[s] that regardless of a school's
policy on affirmative action, race always matters, particularly for students who attend
schools with anti-affirmative action policies."8 5 And she declares that "[a] lmost three-
fourths of students in states that bar race-based admissions reported feeling pressure to
prove themselves because of their racial group membership compared to less than half
of students who attend schools with race-based admissions. Indeed, the difference
between these two groups' responses is statistically significant.
8 6
Unfortunately, these conclusions do not follow from her actual findings, given her
constant shifts from assumptions about the climate of a given state to the realities of
what is supposedly happening at a given institution. Professor Bowen has simply not
established key cause and effect relationships for many of her most interesting and
potentially important findings. For example, in a footnote to one of the statements
quoted above,8 7 she states that "[a] particularly poignant piece of data from the study,
is the effect of the colorblind ideal on students who were admitted to school based on
the normative white meritocracy criteria. The spirit injury is acute in this group." 88 But
the fact that a group of students are attending college in states that have imposed bans
on affirmative action at public institutions tells us nothing about the bases on which
these particular students were admitted. We simply do not know whether any of the
students in her sample "attend[ing] schools in anti-affirmative action states" are
attending a public or private institution and, as a result, were in fact actually "admitted
on purely white, normative admissions standards."
8 9
81. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26, cl. 1. For a detailed history of Proposition 2 fiom the point of
view of those supporting it, see CAROL M. ALLEN, ENDING RACIAL PREFERENCES: THE MICHIGAN
STORY (2008).
82. Bowen, supra note l, at 1218 n. 111.
83. Id. at 1199.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1207.
86. Id. at 1223 (emphasis in original).
87. See supra text accompanying note 85.
88. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1207 n.46.
89. Id. at 1234.
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The critical research question is not which state is involved, but which institution.
Absent that information, we simply cannot know whether "critical mass is more likely
to occur," or whether "students [will be] least likely to report stigma or overt racism,"
because we do not know whether the university in question is actually using "race-
based admissions." 90 This does not mean that some of Professor Bowen's findings are
not interesting, or that some of what the students reveal is not poignant. It does
establish the need to exercise considerable care when reading this article, much less in
basing any action on it.
III.
There is nevertheless a great deal to be said for Professor Bowen's discussion of the
potential importance of "critical mass," which she describes as necessary so that
"minority students.., are viewed not as a token aesthetic, but first and foremost as
legitimate citizens of the classroom to be engaged on their own terms." 91 The Court's
acceptance of the critical mass concept is arguably the most controversial aspect of
Grutter. As both the majority and dissent noted, the concept conjured up the image of
the quota system adopted by the University of California, Davis Medical School and
rejected in Bakke.92 But the majority rejected the argument that Michigan's policy was
a quota in disguise, accepting the university's argument that '[s]ome attention to
numbers,' without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid
quota.,
93
The concept is nevertheless a dangerous one. It is one thing to say that an institution
believes critical mass is important and will pursue it within the constraints imposed by
the narrow tailoring requirements articulated in Grutter. It is quite another, as the
Hopwood v. Texas94 litigation revealed, to resist the temptation to cut comers in the
face of political and social pressure to get the "right" numbers. That said, Professor
Bowen provides potentially valuable evidence that the importance of critical mass is
something more than a simple matter of experience or belief 95
It is important to recognize, however, that many of the problems Professor Bowen
identifies may well not be confined to situations where affirmative action is unavailable
or where a critical mass has not been achieved. Educators need to recognize that
90. Id. at 1199.
91. Id. at 1199.
92. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,329-30 (2003) (accepting Michigan's argument
that critical mass "is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce" and did not reflect "outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional"); id.
at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Stripped of its 'critical mass' veil, the Law School's
program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.").
93. Id. at 336 (quoting Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,323
(1978)).
94. 78 F.3d 932, 936 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that officials at the University of Texas
School of Law lowered its admissions index in order to admit more members of a particular
group).
95. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318-20 (relying on the experience-based beliefs of Dean
Jeffrey Lehman and Professor Kent Syverud of the University of Michigan Law School to
support the need for a critical mass).
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admitting a critical mass of minority students is only the necessary first step in the
process of realizing the supposed benefits of diversity. As I have noted in my own
work,96 many institutions and individuals assume that it is enough to achieve "structural
diversity," generally defined as the numerical representation of a critical mass of
minority students.97 The underlying assumption in many affirmative action policies is
that structural diversity alone provides "students with opportunities to interact with
peers who are different from themselves and that these interactions ultimately
contribute to a supportive campus environment and mediate students' intellectual and
personal development. 98
Admitting a wide array of students is clearly an important first step. As one recent
study notes, "[s]tructural diversity is perceived as a catalyst for promoting a more
hospitable campus racial climate."99 However, despite the importance of structural
diversity, research has revealed "that the singular act of increasing the number of
people of color on a campus will not create a more positive racial climate.
' °00
Structural diversity is accordingly "a necessary, but not sufficient, factor" if the goal is
to actually create "a more comfortable and less hostile environment for all."' ' As
Professor Patricia Gurin has explained, "'If diversity is really going to mean anything,
it is not just having students [of different races] in the same place. They have to
interact.... They need to learn to have deep and meaningful conversations about
topics that people want to avoid."' 0 2 As she and her colleagues noted even before
Grutter was decided, "[a]lthough structural diversity increases the probability that
96. See Killenbeck, supra note 15, at 47-48.
97. This is also called "representational diversity" or "numeric diversity." Even here, there
are nuances. For example, "unitary" structural diversity simply measures the number of white
students to the number of minority students. See Pidot, supra note 63, at 765-67. "Heterogenic"
diversity considers the number of different racial and ethnic groups represented in the student
body. Id. at 765. Finally, "multifactored" diversity considers the race and ethnicity of
individuals as well as other attributes including "socioeconomic, geographic, and ideological
diversity, as well as a diversity of skills, interests, and experiences, and demonstrated ability to
overcome different kinds of disadvantages." Kenneth L. Marcus, Diversity andRace-Neutrality,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 163, 167-68 (2008), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2008/39.
98. Gary R. Pike & George D. Kuh, Relationships Among Structural Diversity, Informal
Peer Interactions and Perceptions of the Campus Environment, 29 REv. HIGHER EDUC. 425,
426 (2006).
99. Sylvia Hurtado, Kimberly A. Griffin, Lucy Arellano & Marcela Cuellar, Assessing the
Value of Climate Assessments: Progress and Future Directions, 1 J. DivERSrrY HIGHER EDUC.
204, 207 (2008).
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Dorothy A. Brown, Taking Grutter Seriously: Getting Beyond the
Numbers, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1, 17 (2006) (arguing that "[s]tructural diversity without more...
will not" achieve the goals embraced by the Court in Grutter because it "will not influence
student outcomes"); Jiali Luo & David Jamieson-Drake, A Retrospective Assessment of the
Educational Benefits of Interaction Across Racial Boundaries, 50 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 67, 84
(2009) ("Structural diversity is only the first step in a journey of a thousand miles to capitalize
on the educational value of multicultural diversity.").
102. Peter Schmidt, "Intergroup Dialogue " Promoted as Using Racial Tension to Teach,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 16, 2008 (quoting Professor Patricia Gurin).
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students will encounter others of diverse backgrounds, given the U.S. history of race
relations, simply attending an ethnically diverse college does not guarantee that
students will have the meaningfil intergroup interactions that... are important for the
reduction of racial prejudice."' 10 3 These interactions must, moreover, be conducted with
care, as simply "'[talking about these topics can blow up if you don't do it right. ' ' ' °4
As the authors of one very important recent study stress, "[t]he challenge to colleges
and universities is to 'move beyond Michigan' and make the most of diversity."'
0 5
Their point is an arguably simple one: "[d]iversity work does not end at the admission
office.' ' 106 It is nevertheless one that is often overlooked. And it is one that must be
taken into account when exploring the actual educational outcomes associated with
diversity and critical mass. Professor Bowen provides suggestive support for the value
of critical mass. But the limitations imposed on her work mean that we must be very
careful in drawing any conclusions from the data and anecdotes she has assembled.
CONCLUSION
It is essential that the higher education community document the extent to which
widespread assumptions about the value of affirmative action and diversity are borne
out by actual educational and social outcomes. Certain portions of Professor Bowen's
article advance our understanding and lay potentially valuable foundations for the
future. But a number of the claims she makes are simply not supported by her research,
given the methodological shortcomings of her study.
Professor Bowen arguably anticipated these criticisms by noting that her human
subjects research board would not let her gather certain information,' 0 7 given "the
sensitive nature of the subject."' 08 That reflects a reality that scholars working in this
area routinely encounter. It also, ironically, places her in the company of Professor
Richard H. Sander, a scholar who reaches essentially opposite conclusions about
affirmative action.'0 9 Sander, like Bowen, has tried to examine with care the "massive
social experiment" regarding "whether the use of racial preferences in college and
graduate school admissions could speed the process of fully integrating American
society."
11 0
103. Patricia Gurin, Eric L. Dey, Sylvia Hurtado & Gerald Gurin, Diversity and Higher
Education: Theory and Impact of Educational Outcomes, 72 HARv. EDUC. REV. 330, 333
(2002).
104. Schmidt, supra note 102 (quoting Professor Patricia Gurin).
105. THoMAs J. ESPENSHADE& ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, No LONGER SEPARATE, NOT
YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPus LwE 388 (2009).
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
108. Bowen, supra note 1, at 1216 n.104. She also states that she "gained access to the
conference" at which she gathered her data "through a two-year negotiations process," id. at
1215 n.99, but does not explain why it took so long to secure permission to undertake what
precisely the sort of study that all educational professionals should be interested in supporting.
109. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REv. 367, 371 (2004) (describing affirmative action in law school
admissions as a "system of racial preferences that, in one realm after another, produces more
harms than benefits for its putative beneficiaries").
110. Id. at368.
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Sander's controversial study suggests that affirmative action in legal education may
do more harm than good by admitting minority students to programs for which they are
ill-prepared and within which they struggle to succeed."' Sander stresses that, given
his personal background and professional interests, he "consider[s him]self to be
someone who favors race-conscious strategies in principle, if they can be pragmatically
justified."'" 2 That has not assuaged his critics, who argue that he writes with an
,agenda."' 1 3 More to the point, Sander has encountered considerable difficulties in
securing the information he needs to conduct his research," 14 in one instance resorting
to litigation in an attempt to secure data that had apparently been given to others."
5
The inability to look candidly and rigorously at what affirmative action and
diversity actually accomplish, simply because the subject is "controversial," or because
one or the other side in the debate disagrees with a scholar's agenda (real or imagined),
is a telling indictment. Not, however, of Professor Sander's work per se, or in this
instance, that of Professor Bowen. It reflects and condemns, rather, unfortunate aspects
of the climate within which we now labor. Historically, both the existence and details
of affirmative action admission have been treated "like an embarrassing family
secret."' 1 6 As Rupert W. Nacoste, an academic psychologist who has studied these
matters, stressed as the Hopwood litigation was unfolding:
Many colleges and universities have made a critical mistake in managing their
affirmative-action policies: They have hidden the procedures they follow to admit
students, including the weight they give to an applicant's racial or ethnic
background. Whatever the reasons for this strategy, the institutions' failure to
discuss affirmative action in concrete, procedural terms has set the stage for the
premature elimination of affirmative action in higher education. 117
It is time to get beyond fears and sensitivities and confront, openly and honestly, the
issues and opportunities that face us. Professor Bowen's article is a step in the right
direction. I wish she had been allowed to gather key information that would have
permitted her to fully explore the issues and properly draw some of the conclusions she
tries to advance. At the same time, I am pleased that she has laid the foundations for
111. Id. at 372-74.
112. Id. at 371.
113. See Peter Schmidt, Scholars Mount Sweeping Effort to Measure Effects of Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 18, 2008, at A 19. The
article describes new work being undertaken by Professor Sander and quotes Professor Charles
E. Daye: "'I am not going to characterize the study.... I can tell you that they have a project
that is on a mission."' Id. Shirley J. Wilcher, Executive Director of the American Association
for Affirmative Action, in turn declared that "'we view the likely outcome of this research with
skepticism, given Mr. Sander's previous work."' Id.
114. See Sander, supra note 109, at 409 n. 117 (noting that only seven law schools
"responded thoroughly" to the request for information about their admissions processes and
results).
115. See Nancy McCarthy, Researcher Sues Bar for Exam Data, CAL. B.J., Sept. 2008, at 1.
116. Gary Peller, Espousing a Positive Vision ofAffirmative-Action Politics, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Dec. 18, 1991, atB1.
117. Rupert W. Nacoste, The Truth About Affirmative Action, CHRON. HIGMEREDUC. (Wash.,
D.C.), Apr. 7, 1995, at A48.
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reasoned consideration of the importance of critical mass, subject to the reservations I
have noted about the need to place any discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
critical mass in the contexts provided by recognizing that institutions need to do more
than simply admit students from historically under represented groups. For me, and I
suspect many others, the ultimate value of Professor Bowen's work will lie in what she
does to follow up on this first step, rather than in the details of what she written here. I
for one hope she persists in these efforts.
